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Outlawed and Exiled: Zero Tolerance and Second Generation Race Discrimination in Public Schools

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I. INTRODUCTION

Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today, it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.1

More than half a century has passed since Brown v. Board of Education declared unlawful the long-standing national policy of “separate but equal”2 and changed the face of American public school education. The doctrine of “separate but equal” permitted states and local school districts to maintain dual school systems, one for whites, another for African-Americans, and “created gross and obvious disparities” in the educational opportunities available to African-American public school children.3 Today, education remains a paramount responsibility of state and local governments. As Justice Robert Orr of the North Carolina Supreme Court recently observed:

The world economy and technological advances of the twenty-first century mandate the necessity that the State step forward, boldly and decisively, to see that all children, without regard to their socio-economic circumstances, have an educational opportunity and experience that not only meet the constitutional mandates set forth in Leandro, but fulfill the dreams and aspirations of the founders of our state and nation. Assuring that our children are afforded the chance to become contributing, constructive members of society is paramount.4

Yet, now, fifty plus years after the decision in Brown v. Board of Education, policies of zero tolerance, widely adopted by public school systems nationwide, have spawned a second generation of discrimination in our public schools.5 Broadly defined, zero tolerance policies

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2. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the segregation of white and “colored” railway passengers as a reasonable law to preserve the peace and public order).
3. Avarita L. Hanson, Have Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies Turned into a Nightmare? The American Dream’s Promise of Equal Educational Opportunity Grounded in Brown v. Board of Education, 9 U.C. Davis J. Juv. L. & Pol’y 289, 291 (2005) [hereinafter Hanson]. “Schools catering to only African-Americans had less trained and paid teachers, higher pupil-teacher ratios, fewer curricular and extra-curricular activities, and poor physical plants to which these students had to travel further and longer than white children.” Id.
4. Hoke County Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004) “In Leandro, this Court, in sum, decreed that the State and State Board of Education had constitutional obligations to provide the state’s school children with an opportunity for a sound basic education, and that the state’s school children had a fundamental right to such an opportunity.” Id. at 376 (citing Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 257 (N.C. 1997)).
5. Libero Della Piana, Reading, Writing, Race and Resegregation: 45 Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 4 Colorines (Spring 1999), available at http://www.colorines.com/article.php?ID=107. See also Ira Glasser and Alan Levine, Bringing Student Rights to New York City’s School System, 1 J. L. & Educ. 213 (1972) (finding a refined system of suspension and expulsion punishments toward black students the results of which were so profound and effective that “southern style” segregation was unnecessary).
are "administrative rules intended to address specific problems associated with school safety and discipline." 6 Most state and local zero tolerance school policies have their genesis in the Gun Free School Act of 1994,77 intended by Congress to promote school safety by declaring zero tolerance for weapons in public schools.8

"Over time, however, zero tolerance has come to refer to school or district-wide policies that mandate pre-determined, typically harsh, consequences or punishments (such as suspension and expulsion) for a wide degree of rule violation." 9 School authorities have "extended what appeared to be a necessary, fair, limited, and specific response to school violence provided by federal law into areas neither contemplated nor addressed by the initial enactment." 10 In many school districts, zero tolerance now applies to "frequent and usual student behaviors - minor, disruptive behaviors, such as tardiness, class absences, disrespect, and noncompliance," 11 as well as any conduct identified by school officials as "gang-related."

On the whole, zero tolerance policies adopted by local school boards, particularly policies prohibiting "gang-related" conduct, are poorly drafted and fail "to balance the need for school safety with

8. 20 U.S.C. § 8921(b)(1) (2000) (repealed 2002). (The Act mandated that all states receiving Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) funds adopt a policy under which any student determined to have brought a weapon to school would be suspended from school for not less than one year. Although Congress repealed The Gun-Free Schools Act with the enactment of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, under No Child Left Behind, the Gun-Free Schools Act was re-enacted as 20 U.S.C. § 1751(b)(1)).
10. Hanson, at 308-09.
maintaining educational opportunity for students.”

Under the guise of protecting school safety, zero tolerance denies a public school education and creates a “schoolhouse-to-jailhouse” pathway for a statistically indefensible number of minority students.

Numerous accounts lead to the same issue and conclusion: School authorities disproportionately target African-American (and Latino) students for discipline. Much like the minority experience in other settings, minority students are subject to racial profiling in the application of zero tolerance policies. It is found with clear and convincing evidence that minority students receive more harsh punitive measures (suspension, expulsion, corporal punishment) and less mild discipline than their non-minority peers, even controlling for socioeconomic status.

African-American children represent 17% of public school enrollment nationwide, but 33% of all out-of-school suspensions. White students, on the other hand, represent 63% of public school enrollment, but only 50% of out-of-school suspensions. Also, Latino students are singled out for discipline. In Tennessee, for example, more than 38% of Latino public school students have been suspended.

“Minority children are clearly being profiled for application of zero tolerance policies and bearing a disproportionate brunt of its effects.”

12. *Id.* at 311. “[W]hile expulsion and suspension may be necessary tools for maintaining school safety, overuse and overapplication of these tools is viewed by some advocates as counter to ‘the fundamental purpose of public education -- the purpose of preparing children to live in a democratic society.’” *Id.* at 316 (quoting William Haft, *More Than Zero Tolerance: The Cost of Zero Tolerance and the Case for Restorative Justice in Schools*, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 795, 797 (2000)).


[M]any school districts to subject minority students, particularly low-income African American males, to disproportionate amounts of punishment. Based ostensibly upon their desire to maintain a safe and orderly environment, a number of school districts engage in disciplinary practices that result in large numbers of minority students being suspended and expelled from school.


15. *Id.*

16. *Id.*

17. Hanson, *supra* note 3, at 334 (citing Bobby LaFolla, *School-to-Prison Pipeline*, BOSTON'S WEEKLY DIG, (July 1, 2003), available at http://www.weeklydig.com/news_opinions/articles/schooltoprision_pipeline_2) (New “zero tolerance” approaches to discipline have almost doubled...
Students of color are more likely to receive suspension for non-violent, minor misconduct such as disobedience, disruption, and disrespect of authority. Research shows that these disparities are not due to poverty or inherently bad behavior, but instead, are largely the result of racial and cultural bias by public school officials. Available empirical evidence suggests, for example, that such common behavior as student inattention is often viewed differently, depending on race. White teachers tend to interpret the inattentiveness of black students as resulting from the students' putative low attention spans, while the same behavior by white students is viewed merely as "an indication that the teacher needed to do more to gain the student's interest."

Beverly Cross, an urban education specialist at the University of Wisconsin-Madison says that, "Racism rests just beneath the surface of zero-tolerance decisions." In large part, black students are excluded because of what has been called "the 'hidden curriculum' or rules with respect to obedience to authority, time schedules, cutting class, and in some instances, fighting with other students. While white students have doubled, whites represented 53.1% of suspended students; African Americans 32.7%; and Hispanics 14.5%.

The number of students suspended annually in the last 30 years, from 1.7 million to 3.1 million, while the total number of students enrolled in elementary and high schools has stayed flat since 1970 at about 50 million. Minorities have been disproportionately punished. According to the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights, black students are 2.6 times more likely to be suspended than white students. The Department of Education's Office of Special Education Programs showed a similar racial inequality in the percentage of students suspended for more than one day from 1972 to 2000. For white students, the percentage rose from 3.1 percent to 5.09 percent; for black students, it rose from 6 percent to 13.2 percent.


There are disturbing racial disparities in student suspension rates by race, specifically with respect to black male students. In school year 1974-5, 65.7% of suspended students were white, 28.7% were African American, and 5% were Hispanic. By 1998, after the total number of suspended students doubled, whites represented 53.1% of suspended students; African Americans 32.7%; and Hispanics 14.5%.

Id. (citing Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Projected Student Suspension Rate Values for the Nation's Public Schools, by Race and Ethnicity—Elementary and Secondary School Civil Rights Compliance Reports (2000)). The Condition of Education 1997, published by the U.S. Department of Education, found that almost 25% of all African American male students were suspended at least once over a four-year period. Id. See also OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9.


students are punished for the same activities, discipline of whites is imposed at disproportionately lower rates. 23 Students of color are routinely denied the same educational opportunities provided to white students most often as a consequence of racially disparate disciplinary actions imposed without due process of law. 24

Equally alarming is the increasing frequency with which school disciplinary proceedings, especially for students of color, result in referral to the juvenile justice or adult justice system. 25 “[A]ctions formerly considered childish or adolescent acts, even actions where there is no violence, such as having a pager at school, have taken on or been given criminal definition, along with criminal consequences.” 26 Not surprisingly, the negative effects of these policies fall disproportionately on children of color. 27

“Zero tolerance enforcement is clearly a civil rights issue - perhaps the most compelling issue to be addressed in the context of Brown in the new millennium.” 28 Constitutional challenges to zero tolerance policies.


25. Hanson, supra note 3, at 328 (citing OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9, at 13 (finding that school districts “are simply transferring their disciplinary authority to law enforcement officials” and that 41 states require schools to report students to law enforcement agencies for various conduct committed in school, fail to monitor implementation of referrals, and “perhaps unintentionally, set off an explosion in the criminalization of children for understandable mistakes or ordinary childhood behavior.”)).

26. Hanson, supra note 3, at 329 (citing Sara Rimer, Unruly Students Facing Arrest, Not Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2004, at 1 (City and suburban schools nationwide are increasingly sending students to the juvenile justice system for adolescent behaviors such as “shouting at classmates and violating the dress code” that used to be handled by school administrators.)). “[I]nstead of addressing discipline of students at the school level, our children are being treated as criminals - in the scheme of the criminal justice system - and without much of the legal protections afforded to adults charged with criminal violations.” Id. (citing Kathleen M. Cerrone, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994: Zero Tolerance Takes Aim at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L. REV. 131, 164-75 (1999)).


Despite common stereotypical beliefs by some about urban school children and African-American children, the profile of a gun-toting student who was likely to go on a killing rampage was not an urban black male, but was more likely to be a rural or small town white male who had ready access to guns.

Hanson, supra note 3, at 344.

28. Hanson, supra note 3, at 336-37 (citing National Association of Secondary School Principals, Statement on the Civil Rights Implications of Zero Tolerance Programs before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Feb. 18, 2000 (advocating that discretion is needed to ensure
generally allege violations of equal protection and procedural or substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, or that the policy itself is void for vagueness. Regrettably, case law examining zero tolerance policies has been slow to develop, primarily because "many parents often do not have the mindset, time, or means to pursue redress against the educational 'system' beyond the administrative process through the courts, and the parents who do have the resources are often ostracized, frustrated, and unsuccessful." 

This article seeks to assist practitioners in identifying claims of second-generation discrimination against local school systems based on racially disparate enforcement of zero tolerance policies. It first sets out potential federal and state constitutional claims based on violations of equal protection, procedural due process, and vagueness. It concludes by identifying several defenses school systems commonly offer to escape accountability for perpetuating second generation segregation and depriving children of color of their constitutionally guaranteed equal access to a basic public education.

29. Hanson, supra note 3, at 360. See OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED, supra note 9, Appendix II, Legal Protections for Students Facing Zero Tolerance Policies, for a more detailed legal discourse on challenges to zero tolerance policies). See also Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 (2001) (generally explaining zero tolerance policies, means of challenging them, their effects on school students, and general ineffectiveness). "The importance of an education to a child is substantial, and the state cannot condition its availability upon compliance with an unconstitutionally vague standard of conduct." Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 74-5 (1969) (citations omitted) (high school district governing board's "dress policy" concerning hair styles, which provided that "extremes of hair style are not acceptable," found unconstitutionally vague). See infra text accompanying notes 164-179.


There are relatively few reported court cases involving school discipline, probably for several reasons. School discipline matters are primarily handled in administrative proceedings that have usually been unreported, at least in traditional written legal reports. The courts in which juveniles usually appear are not courts of record. Additionally, it may be posited that few families can bear the expense of litigating these matters that may involve difficult constitutional claims and require attorneys. Few cases have reached the courts, but those cases that have been litigated demonstrate the common law, statutes, facts, and theories used to uphold zero tolerance applications.

Id. at 356-57.


32. This article is intended as the first in a series. Follow-up articles will include discussion of other constitutional and state law claims, such as discrimination claims under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and N.C. Gen. Stat. Ch. 99D, defamation, and negligent supervision, personal and official liability, available remedies, class actions, and pretrial litigation strategies.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS

The primary vehicle for bringing a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection or due process claim is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which states:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress.33

"Person" within the meaning of § 1983 includes local boards of education, superintendents, and other school officials.34 Even in state court, federal law controls actions brought under § 1983.35

“One whose equal protection or due process rights have been abridged [by a State actor also] has a direct claim under the North Carolina Constitution.”36

The civil rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in Article I of our Constitution are individual and personal rights entitled to protection against state action under the rationale adopted in the above-cited authorities. The Declaration of Rights was passed by the Constitutional Convention on 17 December 1776, the day before the Constitution itself was adopted, manifesting the primacy of the Declaration in the minds of the framers. The fundamental purpose for its adoption was to provide citizens with protection from the State’s encroachment upon these rights. Encroachment by the State is, of course, accomplished by the acts of individuals who are clothed with the authority of

33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). Although beyond the scope of this article, § 1981 may provide another avenue to challenge racially discriminatory school disciplinary policies. Originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act Apr. 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, § 1981 provides, “All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” The Supreme Court has held that students have a protectable property interest in a public school education. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). See also Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 259 (N.C. 1997) (The North Carolina Constitution “guarantee[s] every child of the state the opportunity to receive a ‘sound basic education . . .’”)


the State. The very purpose of the Declaration of Rights is to ensure
that the violation of these rights is never permitted by anyone who
might be invested under the Constitution with the powers of the
State. 37

Although not directly controlling, federal decisions are highly persuas-
ive in actions alleging State constitutional claims. 38

A. Equal Protection

_We are confronted primarily with a moral issue. It is as old as the_
_Scriptures and is as clear as the American Constitution._

— John F. Kennedy 39

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states,
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” 40 Similarly, the North Carolina Constitution
states, “No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws;
nor shall any person be subjected to discrimination by the State be-
cause of race, color, religion, or national origin.” 41 The North Caro-
lina Constitution further provides that, “[t]he people have a right to
the privilege of education,” 42 and “public schools shall be maintained
. . . wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.” 43

Equal Protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and Ar-
ticle I, section 19 can be used to challenge school disciplinary actions
or policies where disparate treatment can be traced, at least in part, to
racial hostility on the part of school officials. 44 “The central purpose

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38. See, e.g., Toomer v. Garrett, 574 S.E.2d 76, 86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (“Decisions as to the
scope of procedural due process provided by the federal constitution are highly persuasive with
respect to that afforded under our state constitution.”).
www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm).
40. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights in Article I of our Constitution are individual and per-
sonal rights entitled to protection against state action . . . .”). “The Supreme Court of North
Carolina has held that the guarantee of equal protection provided in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution has been expressly incorporated in Article I, § 19 of the N.C.
Constitution, and thus the same analysis may be applied to both.” Toomer, 574 S.E.2d at 88
S.S. Kresge Co. v. Davis, 178 S.E.2d 382 (N.C. 1971); Hajoca Corp. v. Clayton, 178 S.E.2d 481
(N.C. 1971).
42. N.C. Const. art. I, § 15.
43. N.C. Const. art. IX, § 1.
Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of
its creatures - Boards of Education not excepted.”). “The history of litigation challenging racial
disparities in education suggests that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution may provide a means to contest school discipline policies.”
Adira Siman, Challenging Zero Tolerance: Federal and State Legal Remedies for Students of
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of race.\textsuperscript{45} “Any distinction made on the basis of race in a publicly-supported institution is a patent violation of the law, not to be tolerated by a court that is controlled by the Constitution of the United States.”\textsuperscript{46} To state an equal protection claim under either the federal or state constitution, the plaintiff must allege purposeful discrimination by school officials motivated by racial animus.\textsuperscript{47} A complaint that alleges purposeful discrimination based on race is sufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.

In Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Board,\textsuperscript{48} the plaintiffs sued a public school teacher, the principal, the local school board, the school superintendent, and the school board’s insurer, alleging racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1976).\textsuperscript{49} The district court granted the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ race discrimination claims. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that plaintiffs’ complaint stated a valid claim and reversed the trial court’s order of dismissal.

In this case, the plaintiffs pleaded intent and purpose to discriminate on the part of the defendants. At this stage, we review only the sufficiency of these allegations. Whether there is evidence to support the charge, and, if so, its sufficiency may not be tested by a motion to dismiss. The district court, therefore, improperly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim for a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.\textsuperscript{50}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238 (1976). See also Richardson v. N.C. Dept. of Corr., 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (N.C. 1996) (Equal protection “requires that all persons similarly situated be treated alike.”).
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 1967).
  \item \textsuperscript{48} Coleman v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 702 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1983).
  \item \textsuperscript{49} Id. at 75-76. The complaint alleged that:
  \begin{itemize}
    \item the black child was engaged in minor horseplay in the school hall with a white boy of similar age and grade; the teacher, Bobbie Bruce, struck him on the head with a coffee cup, causing a small cut on the black child’s head; the white child was not disciplined in any way; after school that day, the black child was taken by his mother to a doctor who sutured the cut with two stitches.
  \end{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{50} Id. at 77.
\end{itemize}
Allegations of selective prosecution of school disciplinary policies likewise state a valid equal protection claim, as do allegations of racial profiling.

In discrimination claims under § 1983, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's actions were motivated by racial animus. The plaintiff is not required to prove that race discrimination was the sole reason for the defendant's actions, only that discrimination was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to take the challenged action.

The plaintiff may meet this burden by resorting to "ordinary principles of proof using any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and sufficiently probative of the issue." Although blatant acts of race discrimination do occur, most often, discrimination is carried out insidiously by persons quick to assert a ready explanation for their actions. Recognizing the insidious nature of race discrimination, the Supreme Court developed an alternate method of proof for use by plaintiffs in cases where direct evidence of discriminatory motive is lacking. In such cases, plaintiffs may rely on the three-part burden shifting process established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas v. Green. Under this process, once a plaintiff presents evi-

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51. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). ("The decision whether to prosecute may not be based on 'an unjustifiable standard such as race. . . .' "). By this same token, the decision to discipline a student may not be so based, See Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1336-1341 (11th Cir. 2000) (court found sufficient evidence of discrimination when two white law enforcement officers were disciplined while their black counterparts were not disciplined for the same offense); State v. Rogers, 315 S.E.2d 492, 505 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (selective prosecution claim not valid because "a failure to prosecute others because of a lack of knowledge that they were subject to prosecution for the same offense as defendant does not amount to a denial of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." (citation omitted)). Accord, Cohn v. New Paltz Cent. Sch. Dist., 171 Fed. Appx. 877 (2d Cir. 2006) (Suspended high school student's complaint, alleging that punishment imposed upon him by school official was disproportionate as compared to punishment official imposed upon two other students who engaged in similar misconduct, and alleging that "[t]his disparate treatment was without any rational basis and violated plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law," stated "class of one" equal protection claim, notwithstanding student's failure to identify actual instances where others had been treated differently, and his failure to assert that differential treatment was "intentional.").

52. Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d 911, 917-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000). In Fennell, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's action alleging a pattern and practice of racially-influenced traffic stops of Black motorists by the North Carolina Highway Patrol. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed.


56. Id.

dence to satisfy the elements of the applicable prima facie case, a presumption of discriminatory motive arises. ⁵⁸

At the first stage of the McDonnell Douglas three-part burden-shifting process, the plaintiff is required only to meet the minimal standard of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination. ⁵⁹ To meet this burden, the plaintiff need only present some evidence of each element of the prima facie case. ⁶⁰ This is not an onerous requirement ⁶¹ and poses "a burden easily met." ⁶² Once a plaintiff satisfies the elements of the applicable prima facie case, a presumption of discriminatory motive arises.

During the initial proof stage, plaintiffs are not required to prove discriminatory motive. ⁶³ When assessing a plaintiff's prima facie case at the first stage of proof, the court must examine the plaintiff's evidence independently and without regard to any nondiscriminatory purpose that may be asserted by the defendant. ⁶⁴ The first stage is concerned only with the plaintiff's prima facie case. Any justification or other evidence proffered by the defendant is not relevant at this stage. Otherwise, the first and second stages would be collapsed into one, contrary to the three-part process required under McDonnell Douglas.

At the first stage, the plaintiff is not required to offer direct evidence of discrimination. To the contrary, if the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process does not apply. ⁶⁵ Indirect evidence of discrimination is critical to proof of the plaintiff's prima facie case. Indirect evidence is any evidence upon which the trier of fact could base a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive and can take a wide variety of

⁵⁸. See Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 195 F.3d 134, 146 (2d Cir. 1999) (specifically applying the burden-shifting analysis to school discrimination claim).
⁶⁰. Id.
⁶¹. Id. See also Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 41 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[T]o establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only make a very minimal showing.").
⁶². Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 1987). A major purpose behind the Supreme Court's adoption of the three-part burden-shifting process in discrimination cases is to help the parties and the court resolve "the disparity in access to information between" the plaintiff and defendant regarding the true motives behind the defendant's action. Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1192 (11th Cir. 1998). Courts should not use the first stage as a tool to dismiss plaintiff's claims, but as a tool to help bring the parties "expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate question." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
⁶⁴. EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare, 220 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000).
⁶⁵. Brown v. E. Miss. Elec. Power Assoc., 989 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir., 1993), reh'g denied, 995 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1993). See also, Bynum v. Hobbs Realty, No. 100-CV-1143, 3, 2002 WL 1065866 (M.D.N.C. April 4, 2002) (plaintiffs' claim "based upon what has been deemed to constitute a sufficient showing of direct evidence of discrimination, that is, the alleged racially derogatory statement of [the defendant], so as to create an issue of fact without resort to the McDonnell Douglas test.").
forms. For example, evidence that school officials systematically disciplined minority students more harshly than similarly situated white students, whether or not such evidence is rigorously statistical, would constitute circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination.66

In *Hawkins v. Coleman*,67 for example, after hearing expert witnesses, the court found that black students were suspended more often, and for longer periods, than white students, and that the majority of suspensions were for minor, nonviolent offenses.68 The court attributed this disparity to "institutional racism."69 "Proof of disproportionate impact may provide an important starting point by creating an inference of discriminatory intent and a challenge to a zero tolerance policy would likely rely heavily on such evidence."70

The disparate impact of zero tolerance policies can generally be shown using data on student populations and disciplinary actions. Statistical analyses that establish higher rates of punishment for students of color relative to their representation in the student body and correlations between race and the use of punishment will be particularly useful.71

Indirect evidence of discriminatory motive may also include evidence that the allegedly discriminatory action violated the defendant's own policies,72 evidence that the plaintiff confided detailed accounts

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68. *Id.* at 1337.

69. *Id.* at 1335. *See also* Siman, *supra* note 66, at 335. ("Despite the various alternative justifications, a number of analyses maintain that the best explanation for the disparities is racism or racial stereotyping.").


71. *Id.* (citing *Opportunities Suspended supra* note 9, at 9-13 (June 2000)).

72. *Id.* at 349 (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267). *See also* Briscoe v. Fred's Dollar Store, 24 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1994) (departure from the way defendant's written policy is typically applied); Giacoletto v. Amax Zinc Co., 954 F.2d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendant's failure to follow its own procedures); Ensing v. Vulcraft Corp., 830 F. Supp. 1017 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (defendant's failure to follow established procedures); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992) (defendant's failure to comply with its own procedures); Asbury v. Brougham, 866 F.2d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 1989) (exceptions made to defendant's policies for non-minorities).
to others at the time of the discrimination,\textsuperscript{73} evidence of governmental or agency findings or statistics related to the discrimination,\textsuperscript{74} and evidence of discrimination against others besides the plaintiff.\textsuperscript{75}

Before filing a complaint, plaintiff's counsel should develop strategies for collecting statistical data and other information that may provide indirect evidence of discrimination.\textsuperscript{76} When possible, counsel should submit inquiries to federal and state civil rights agencies such as the United States Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights, and requests for public records under the Federal Freedom of Information Act\textsuperscript{77} and the North Carolina Public Records Act.\textsuperscript{78} Sample requests and other useful information is available through the Civil Rights Project of Harvard University.\textsuperscript{79}

Statistical evidence of racially disparate disciplinary procedures or the imposition of racially disparate disciplinary actions raises an inference of intentional discrimination and would establish a prima facie case of race discrimination against school officials.\textsuperscript{80} Once the plaintiff has presented evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the process of proof moves to the second stage. In the second stage, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.\textsuperscript{81}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} See Carter v. Blakely, No. 1:97CV00982, 1999 WL 1937226, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 1, 1999) (incidents of sexual harassment confided to coworkers).
\item \textsuperscript{74} Soules v. U.S. Dep't of HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 821 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Bronson v. Bd. of Educ. of Cincinnati, No. C-1-74-205, Amended Consent Decree (Doc. #840) (S.D. Ohio 1994) (originally 604 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Ohio 1984)) (Because the court found that disparities in suspension and expulsion rates had not improved since the issuance of the original consent decree, the amended consent decree required schools, \textit{inter alia}, to monitor disciplinary recommendations by teachers and intercede when teachers are responsible for disproportionate referrals). \textit{Cf.} Tasby v. Estes, 643 F.2d 1103, 1107 (3rd Cir. 1981) (holding that plaintiffs had not made out a \textit{prima facie} case for racial discrimination, but noting "[w]e also recognize that prior judicial determinations of racial discrimination in the [school district]'s student disciplinary policies and practices make [the] statistical evidence [of disparities] more persuasive.").
\item \textsuperscript{75} Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir. 1986) (Prior claims by minority public school teachers may provide a source of indirect evidence of discrimination.).
\item \textsuperscript{76} For example, the North Carolina State Board of Education, Department of Public Instruction, publishes an annual study of suspensions and expulsions, broken down by school districts. According to the Annual Study for 2004-05, published in March 2006, of the 6,347 Durham public school students who received short-term suspensions, 5,836, or 92%, were children of color. Of the 64 Durham students suspended long-term, 57 were children of color. OFFICE OF CURRICULUM AND SCHOOL REFORM SERVICES AND OFFICE OF DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT, AGENCY OPERATIONS & MANAGEMENT, STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION/DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, 2004-05 ANNUAL STUDY OF SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS, Appx. B (2006), available at http://www.ncpublicschools.org/schoolimprovement/alternative/reports/.
\item \textsuperscript{77} 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{78} N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-6 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{79} Action Kit, supra note 14.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 (To demonstrate discriminatory intent solely through the existence of a disparate effect of a policy, there must be "a clear pattern" that is "unexplainable on grounds other than race.").
\item \textsuperscript{81} Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting \textit{Burdine}, 450 U.S. at 254).
\end{itemize}
buttable presumption of discrimination, the prima facie case forces defendants to articulate what they claim to be the true reason for the challenged action, thereby eliminating the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff. The purpose of the first stage is simply to force the defendant to proceed with its case.

Because the ultimate burden of proof remains with the plaintiff, the defendant’s burden at the intermediate stage is a burden of production, not a burden of proof. “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons.” However, it must raise “a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.”

To do this,

[T]he defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection. The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff’s prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.

The Supreme Court has consistently stated that to satisfy the intermediate stage of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, a defendant must “produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude” that the challenged action was not motivated by discriminatory animus.

If the defendant declines to present evidence of a legitimate purpose, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested. On the other hand, if the defendant satisfies its burden of production, the presumption of discrimination drops away and the case moves to the third stage in the McDonnell Douglas process.

83. EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861-62 (6th Cir. 1997).
84. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 248.
85. Id. at 255.
86. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.) A proffered justification based on evidence acquired by the defendant after the alleged discrimination was not legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. McKennon v. Nashville Banner, 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995).
87. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 257.
89. Id.
As in any civil action, the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to rebut evidence presented in the defendant’s case-in-chief. Thus, at the third stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s proffered justification was not the true reason behind the challenged action but was a pretext for discrimination. The plaintiff may establish pretext directly or indirectly by persuading the trier of fact that the defendant’s actions were more likely the product of discriminatory motives or that the defendant’s proffered reason is unworthy of credence.90

The plaintiff’s evidence must persuade the trier of fact that the explanation offered by the defendant was not the true reason behind the challenged action. Although the plaintiff must demonstrate by competent evidence that the defendant’s proffered justification was in fact a cover-up for a discriminatory decision,91 “explicit evidence of discrimination – i.e., the ‘smoking gun’ – is not required.”92

In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the plaintiff’s initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier of fact on the issue of whether the defendant’s explanation is pretextual. Indeed, there may be some cases where the plaintiff’s initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to discredit the defendant’s explanation.93

The plaintiff may be able to show that the defendant’s proffered justification is unworthy of credence when the defendant’s justification or explanation for taking the challenged action changes between the time the action was taken and the trial.94

If a plaintiff produces credible evidence that it is more likely than not that “the [defendant] did not act for its proffered reason, then the [defendant’s] decision remains unexplained and the inferences from

90. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
92. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523.
93. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 n.10.
94. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5th Cir. 1996), en banc, (explaining that an inference of discriminatory intent may exist where a defendant’s proffered reasons are false). See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000) (allowing an inference of discriminatory intent where the defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence); Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-Car, NO. 3:96-CV-1092-R, 1997 WL 452737 at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jul 31, 1997) (upholding jury’s finding that the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretext where they were inconsistent and blatantly false).
When the plaintiff shows that the defendant’s actions were more likely the product of a discriminatory motive rather than the defendant’s articulated legitimate reasons, “sufficiently strong evidence” of defendant’s past discrimination may be enough. As in any civil action, the trier of fact is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. In the context of summary judgment, the plaintiff, as the non-moving party, is entitled to the benefit of “every legitimate inference” in her favor. This is especially true in race discrimination cases, where the defendant’s motive is a critical issue to be determined.

Summary judgment is improper in a civil rights case whenever the defendant’s proffered justification raises a suspicion of mendacity on the defendant’s part. “[A] plaintiff should often or usually be able to avoid summary judgment simply by presenting (a) evidence supporting a prima facie case, and (b) evidence tending to falsify the [defendant’s] proffered justification.” In Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-Car, an employment discrimination case, the court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, saying:

95. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 524 (quoting Chipollini v. Spencer Gifts, 814 F.2d 893, 899 (3d Cir. 1987), en banc (stating that summary judgment is improper in a civil rights case whenever the defendant’s proffered justification raises a suspicion of mendacity on the defendant’s part.). See also Smith v. Equitrac Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 727, 737 (S.D. Tex. 2000); Goodman v. Super Star Rent-A-Car, No. 3:96-CV-1092-R, 1997 WL 452737 at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 1997) (citing La-Pierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1996) (upholding jury’s finding that the defendant’s proffered reasons were pretext where they were inconsistent and blatantly false)).
96. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 523.
98. Id. (citing Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 854 (4th Cir. 1985)).
99. Smith v. Equitrac Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 727, 737 (S.D. Tex. 2000). In Smith, an employment discrimination case, the district court discussed the implicative power of mendacity, especially in discrimination actions. The court acknowledged that in some cases, evidence tending to show the falsity of a defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory justification, in and of itself, will support a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive, thereby satisfying the plaintiff’s ultimate burden of proof. The court specifically addressed the power of finding that a defendant’s evidence is false:

Evidence which rises to the level of outright mendacity has considerably more implicative power than [false] evidence which simply suggests the defendant is mistaken, confused, or not as credible as the plaintiff. The explanation for this increased implicative power is that a lie is often considered evidence of the consciousness of guilt.

Id. at 741. See also Briscoe v. Fred’s Dollar Store, Inc., 24 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1994) (defendant’s justification at time of trial differed from reasons given at time of challenged action); Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097, 1101 (8th Cir. 1988) (defendant’s proffered justification at trial differed from explanation originally given to plaintiff).
Finally, the manner in which [defendant] has asserted different reasons for [plaintiff’s] termination during different stages of this litigation is sufficient to raise a “suspicion of mendacity.” The inconsistency of its allegations and the blatant untruthfulness of many of the facts in [defendant’s] response to the EEOC engender reasonable skepticism with the Court as to all of the asserted reasons for [plaintiff’s] termination. There is no question that a reasonable jury could find that [defendant’s] reasons were pretextual.101

Similarly, if the jury disbelieves the defendant’s proffered justification, it “can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the [defendant] is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose.”102

The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity), may, together with the elements of a prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination.103

The credibility of a defendant’s proffered justification is to be assessed based on the information available to the defendant at the time of the challenged action.104

The defendant’s proffered justification does not have to rise to the level of outright untruthfulness to be rejected. Because “clever men may easily conceal their motivations,” courts take a skeptical view of a defendant’s proffered justification when the justification is based on the defendant’s subjective rationales.105 When a defendant offers its own subjective judgment to explain an otherwise poorly documented decision, it exposes itself to the risk that the jury will not believe the proffered justification.106 A school official’s unsubstantiated “suspicion” of gang-related activity proffered as justification for suspension or expulsion would constitute one such subjective rationale. “[A]s a recent report on public school racial discrimination points out, schools that retain some discretion to consider mitigating factors appear to confer leniency when they believe that the student has future pros-

101. Id. at *6 (citing LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 449-50 (5th Cir. 1996)).
105. Soules v. U.S. Dep’t of HUD, 967 F.2d 817, 822 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974)).
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pects that would be destroyed by expulsion, and such calculations are easily influenced by racial stereotypes.”

B. Due Process

That schools are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares it is unlawful for a state actor to “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” Echoing the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, the Law of the Land provision of the North Carolina Constitution provides, “No person shall be . . . outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.” Both provisions reflect a centuries-old, fundamental principal of law that the honor, integrity, and reputation of private citizens should be protected from arbitrary injury by government officials.

This right to due process is extended to the public school system. “[Y]oung people do not ‘shed their constitutional rights’ at the school-


In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held, “The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures Boards of Education not excepted.” “These [Boards of Education] have . . . important, delicate and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.” A public school student who is suspended or expelled without due process is deprived of both property and liberty in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, section 19.

1. Education as Property Interest

The North Carolina Constitution guarantees to all North Carolina children, a fundamental right of an equal opportunity to receive a public school education. It is clear . . . that equal access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process. That right may not be withdrawn on grounds of misconduct absent fundamentally fair due process procedures to determine whether the misconduct has occurred.

The authority possessed by the State to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although concededly very broad, must be exercised consistently with constitutional safeguards. Among other things, the State is constrained to recognize a student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause and which may not be taken away for misconduct without adherence to the minimum procedures required by that Clause.

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115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (“Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how arbitrary.”); James M. Peden, Through a Glass Darkly: Educating with Zero Tolerance, 10 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 369, 377 (2001) (“The authority possessed by the State to proscribe and enforce standards of conduct in its schools, although admittedly very broad, must be exercised in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”).
120. See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.
121. Id.
The Supreme Court’s view has long been that “as long as a property deprivation is not de minimis, its gravity is irrelevant to the question whether account must be taken of the Due Process Clause.”122 In Goss v. Lopez, the Court concluded that a ten-day suspension from school is not de minimis and may not be imposed absent minimal due process procedures.123

A short suspension is, of course, a far milder deprivation than expulsion. But, “education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,” and the total exclusion from the educational process for more than a trivial period, and certainly if the suspension is for 10 days, is a serious event in the life of the suspended child.124

“[Children have] a strong interest in [the] procedural safeguards that minimize the risk of wrongful punishment . . . .”125 By failing to adhere to fundamental principals of due process, school officials “can well break the spirits of the expelled students and of others familiar with the injustice, and do inestimable harm to their education.”126

When a public school student faces suspension for ten days or more, due process requires, at a minimum, the following essential procedures:

(1) notice to parents and student in the form of a written and specific statement of the charges which, if proved, would justify the punishment sought; (2) a full hearing after adequate notice and (3) conducted by an impartial tribunal; (4) the right to examine exhibits and other evidence against the student; (5) the right to be represented by counsel (though not at public expense); (6) the right to confront and examine adverse witnesses; (7) the right to present evidence on behalf of the student; (8) the right to make a record of the proceedings; and (9) the requirement that the decision of the authorities be based upon substantial evidence.127

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123. See id. At least one district court has held that a student’s constitutionally protected property interest in education is also implicated by removal from regular classes and placement in an alternative education program and that, in such cases, the student is entitled to due process prior to such removal and reassignment. Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 954 F. Supp. 1162, 1166-67 (W.D. Tex. 1996) rev’d on other grounds, 111 F.3d 25 (5th Cir. 1997).


127. Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 209 (W.D.N.C. 1972). These same requirements are found in many disciplinary policies adopted by local school boards. See, e.g., Durham Public School Policy 4303.4, governing the procedures for long-term suspensions. The Durham policy includes six of the eight “essential” procedures identified in Givens. It does not require that the hearing be “conducted by an impartial tribunal” or that the decision “be based upon substantial evidence.” DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4303.4, Suspension and Expulsion (1999), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=com_kb&Itemid=1&page=articles&articleid=132.
Due process also requires school officials to warn students that certain types of behavior can result in long-term suspension or expulsion. A hearing must be held before a student is formally expelled, and the charges against the student must be supported by substantial evidence.

2. Reputation as Liberty Interest

The United States Supreme Court has held that public school students have a protectable liberty interest in their good name and reputation and that school officials must afford due process to students suspended from school based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. It is apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.

Local boards of education shall adopt policies not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and North Carolina, governing the conduct of students and establishing procedures to be followed by school officials in suspending or expelling any student, or in disciplining any student if the offensive behavior could result in suspension, expulsion, or the administration of corporal punishment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(a) (2006).

In any case in which the principal recommends a student for a suspension of more than 10 school days, he/she shall provide notice of the suspension to the student's parent/guardian and to the Superintendent. The notice must state the dates for which the suspension is proposed, and provide notice of the alleged conduct and the rule it violates. Subsection (C)(6) of the same policy provides that the hearing panel "shall determine whether the student violated the code of conduct." It does not require a determination that the student's conduct violated the specific rule under which the student was charged, thus setting the stage for this type due process violation. DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4303.4(A), Suspension and Expulsion (1999), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=com_kb&Itemid=1&page=articles&articleid=132.

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The guarantee of due process is “intended to prevent government officials 'from abusing [their] power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.’”\(^\text{134}\) Whenever government officials assign to someone a label or characterization that may be a stigma or badge of disgrace, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.\(^\text{135}\)

In *Wisconsin v. Constantineau*,\(^\text{136}\) the chief of police, acting under authority of a Wisconsin statute, posted notices in every liquor store in town that, because the plaintiff drank to excess, all persons were forbidden, under punishment of law, from selling or giving alcoholic beverages to the plaintiff for a period of one year. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and injunctive relief for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment right of due process. The Court held the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional on its face and enjoined its enforcement:

> It would be naive not to recognize that such “posting” or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embarrassment and ridicule, and it is our opinion that procedural due process requires that before one acting pursuant to State statute can make such a quasi-judicial determination, the individual involved must be given notice of the intent to post and an opportunity to present his side of the matter.\(^\text{137}\)

The North Carolina court reached a similar conclusion in *Toomer v. Garrett*.\(^\text{138}\) In *Toomer*, a State employee sued her employer for violation of due process, alleging that he made false charges against her without notice and without allowing her opportunity to be heard. The North Carolina Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that a right of due process arises whenever governmental action causes damage to a citizen’s reputation.\(^\text{139}\) To establish a due process violation based on false charges by a government employer, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege four elements:

- that the charges made by Defendants were false; 2) that the charges were made public; 3) that the charges were made in the course of discharge or serious demotion; and 4) that the “charges against [her] . . . 'might seriously damage [her] standing and associations in [her] community’ or otherwise 'impose on [her] a stigma or other disability that foreclosed [her] freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities.'”\(^\text{140}\)

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136. Id. at 436.
137. Id. (quoting Constantineau v. Grager, 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Wis. 1969)).
139. Id. at 87.
140. Id. (quoting Shelton Riek v. Story, 75 F. Supp. 2d 480, 487 (M.D.N.C. 1999)) (internal citations omitted).
Although Toomer was decided in the context of State employment, the same right of due process arises whenever "government officials assign to someone a label or characterization that may be a stigma or badge of disgrace."¹⁴¹ "Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented."¹⁴²

"It goes without saying, and needs no elaboration, that a record of expulsion from high school constitutes a lifetime stigma."¹⁴³ When school officials suspend or expel a student based on suspicion of gang-related activities, the harm to the student's reputation can be devastating.¹⁴⁴ A reputation as a gang-member is a badge of disgrace that is all but certain to seriously impair a student's future educational and employment opportunities. Before public school students are assigned such a label and robbed of their good name and reputation, due process requires they be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.

3. Outlawed and Exiled

Reflecting a fundamental principal of law dating back to the Magna Carta, the North Carolina State Constitution Law of the Land provision directs that, "[n]o person shall be . . . outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land."¹⁴⁵ A public school student accused by school officials of gang membership and suspended or expelled from school with no notice or opportunity to be heard is, in every sense, "outlawed" and "exiled" without due process of law in violation of Article I, section 19.

Many, if not most, school disciplinary policies define a "gang" as "any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts."¹⁴⁶ Without regard for the devastation caused by their actions and, more often than not, based on little more than supposition, school officials routinely brand minority

¹⁴¹ Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435.
¹⁴² Id. at 437.
¹⁴⁴ For example, Durham Public School Policy 4301.10 defines a "gang" as "any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts." DURHAM PUB. SCH. CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT POLICY 4301.10, RULE 10 (2006), available at http://www.dpsnc.net/index.php?option=com_kb&Itemid=1&page=articles&articleid=129.
¹⁴⁵ N.C. CONST., art. I, § 19 (emphasis added).
¹⁴⁶ See source cited supra note 144. Wake County defines a "gang" as "any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts, or the purposeful violation of any WCPSS policy, and having a common name or common identifying sign, colors or symbols." WAKE COUNTY BD. OF EDUC. BD. POLICY 6424, available at http://www.wcpss.net/policy-files/series/policies/6424-bp.html.
students “gang-affiliated” without affording them any process at all. “In the name of school safety, schools have implemented unforgiving, overly harsh zero tolerance discipline practices that turn kids into criminals for acts that rarely constitute a crime when committed by an adult.”\(^\text{147}\)

Educational think tanks such as the Justice Policy Institute and the Children’s Law Center agree that “one of the most harmful effects of zero tolerance policies is the criminalization of minors for behavior that was once handled by school administrators.”\(^\text{148}\) With no opportunity to defend themselves, minority students are slaves to the caprice of school officials. Suspicion of “gang-affiliation” almost always results in expulsion or long-term suspension of minority students. These students are not only denied a meaningful public school education, they are exiled from their community of peers.\(^\text{149}\) They are “outlawed” and “exiled” within the plain meaning of Article I, section 19.

While neither term has been subject to judicial interpretation for some thirty years, the terms “outlawed” and “exiled” are in common usage and have a well-recognized, plain meaning.\(^\text{150}\) When the language of a constitutional provision is clear, courts must give the provision its plain meaning.\(^\text{151}\) Further interpretation or construction is not only unnecessary but improper.


149. “Expel” is a commonly recognized synonym for “exile,” and vice versa. ROGET’S II THE NEW THESAURUS 360, 362 (Joseph P. Pickett et al. eds., Houghton Mifflin, 3rd ed. 2003). “Across the United States many public schools have turned into feeder schools for the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Youths are finding themselves increasingly at risk of falling into the school-to-prison pipeline through push-outs (systematic exclusion through suspensions, expulsions, discouragement, and high-stakes testing).” Education on Lockdown, supra note 147, at 11. “The negative and harmful psychological effects on school children of zero tolerance policies may also occur when a student is separated from the general student population by expulsion, not for violation of the law, but for a misapplied application of a policy.” Hanson, supra note 3, at 327. See also Michael F. Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 758, 758 (1963) (citation omitted) (“The device of thrusting out of the group those who have broken its code is very ancient and constitutes the most fearful fate which primitive law could inflict. The offender . . . was driven forth naked into the wild.”).

150. As a noun, the word “outlaw” means a fugitive from the law; a habitual criminal; a rebel; a nonconformist; or a person excluded from normal legal protection and rights. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1249 (Joseph P. Pickett et. al. eds., Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed. 2000). As a verb, it means “to declare illegal; to place under a ban; to prohibit; or to deprive one of the protection of the law.” Id. As a noun, “exile” is commonly defined as an unwilling absence from a home country, or place of residence, banishment, or official expulsion from a home, country, or area. As a verb, “exile” means to banish, to order someone to leave and stay away from a home, country or place. MSN Encarta, available at http://www.encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/exile.html (2006).

At one time, the term “outlawed” appeared in the North Carolina Outlawry Statute, former section 15-48. Under that statute, judges and magistrates were authorized to issue proclamations declaring accused felons fugitives from the law.\textsuperscript{152} The statute also provided that, if an accused felon failed to surrender, “any citizen of the State may capture, arrest, and bring him to justice, and in case of flight or resistance by him, after being called on and warned to surrender, may slay him without accusation of any crime.”\textsuperscript{153}

In 1976, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina declared the Outlawry Statute void as procedurally deficient under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and unconstitutionally capricious and irrational under the Equal Protection Clause.\textsuperscript{154} The statute was repealed the following year and superseded by the North Carolina Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. section 15A-721, \textit{et seq.} The term “outlaw” does not appear in the Uniform Act. The term “outlawed,” within the meaning of Article I, section 19, cannot be interpreted by reference to the Outlawry Statute.

Likewise, the term “exiled” cannot be construed as an order of banishment, compelling an individual to leave the State. With or without due process, such an order is void. In \textit{State v. Doughtie},\textsuperscript{155} after sentencing a defendant to two years on the road, the trial court suspended the sentence on condition the defendant leave the State of North Carolina and not return for two years.\textsuperscript{156} The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed on grounds that the trial court’s order was “in all practical effect a sentence of banishment or exile for two years.”\textsuperscript{157} The court held that no North Carolina court has the power to pass a sentence of banishment, and if it does so, the sentence is void.\textsuperscript{158} In doing so, the court acknowledged:

In many cases this court has sustained the suspension of sentences on condition that the defendant remain for a fixed period of time of good behaviour [sic], pay a certain sum of money, etc.; conditions which were favorable to the defendant, permitting him if he obeyed the conditions to avoid serving the sentence, and in furtherance of sound public policy.\textsuperscript{159}

\textbf{153.} Id.
\textbf{156.} Id. at 924.
\textbf{157.} Id.
\textbf{158.} Id. \textit{See also}, State v. Culp, 226 S.E.2d 841(N.C. Ct. App 1976) (sentence of two years suspended on condition that defendant remove his trailer to some other location in the county is, in practical effect, a sentence of banishment for two years and therefore void).
\textbf{159.} Id.
The court's reasoning in *Doughtie* applies with equal force to expulsion and long-term suspensions of public school students, which often "represent a lost moment to teach children about respect, and a missed chance to inspire their trust in authority figures."\(^{160}\) Students may act out at school for any number of reasons, including stress induced by family members or home situations. Such a student "could benefit from interventions to get on track in her education, but is excluded from the very institution that could and should offer help."\(^{161}\)

There is no more certain way in which to make young people in whom rest the seeds of potential less likely to succeed than to rob them of their basic rights, place on them the stigma of the gang membership, and banish them to the perpetual pall of criminality. Perfectly obvious is that outlawing and exiling our public school students is the very antithesis of education.

The Constitution is a living instrument. All of its words have meaning.\(^{162}\) "It is proper to assume that a constitution is intended to meet and to be applied to new conditions and circumstances as they may arise in the course of the progress of the community."\(^ {163}\) Public school students who are publicly accused of gang membership and expelled or suspended long term are, in every sense, "outlawed" and "exiled." If these words, as used in the North Carolina Constitution Law of the Land, are to have any meaning at all, no other construction is possible.

4. *Void for Vagueness*

Essential to the notion of constitutional due process is the requirement that a law or regulation must provide adequate notice of the conduct prohibited and must offer clear guidance for those who enforce it.\(^{164}\) To survive a constitutional challenge based on vagueness, a disciplinary policy must be written with "sufficient definiteness that

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161. Hanson, supra note 3, at 327 (citing Gail Morrison, Editorial, "Zero Tolerance" Policies Becoming Sticky Webs, 93106 THE FAC. & STAFF NEWSPAPER, VOL. 13, NO. 17, (Santa Barbara, Cal.), May 12, 2003, available at http://www.instadv.ucsb.edu/93106/2003/May12/zero.html (Morrison, a school psychologist, asserts that many students who are not aggressive or violent are getting stuck in the zero tolerance web.).

162. *State v. Emery*, 31 S.E.2d 858, 866 (N.C. 1944) (Rules of construction are "intended to make of the constitution a living thing, prospective in its application, applicable to the needs of humanity and the changed conditions of society where it is possible for the provisions to be so construed.").

163. *Id.*

ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited” and must define the conduct prohibited “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 165 A school disciplinary policy that fails in either respect is subject to challenge as unconstitutionally vague.

In short, a regulation is void-for-vagueness if it “forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .” Second, the void-for-vagueness doctrine prevents arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 166

In Stephenson v. Davenport Community School District, a high school student challenged the school district’s gang policy as void for vagueness. The challenged policy stated, “Gang related activities such as display of ‘colors’, symbols, signals, signs, etc., will not be tolerated on school grounds. Students in violation will be suspended from school and/or recommended to the Board for expulsion.” 167 The student, who had a small cross tattooed between her thumb and index finger, was suspended from school after school officials determined her tattoo was a “gang symbol.” 168 She filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the school district, the school board, and two school officials in their individual capacity based on violations of procedural due process. The district court entered summary judgment for the school defendants, and the student appealed.

The Eighth Circuit began by noting that to “a significant portion of the world’s population,” a cross is viewed “as a representation of their Christian religious faith,” and that, as drafted, the list of “prohibited” materials included many other potential religious symbols. 169 Accordingly, while a lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate because of the public school setting, a proportionately greater level of scrutiny is required because the regulation reaches the exercise of free speech.” 170

Relying in part on the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 171 the court concluded that, without more, the term

167. Id. at 1308.
168. Id.
169. Id. (citing City of Harvard v. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d 259, 261 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (officers testified at hearing that “the six-pointed star is a symbol of Judaism as well as of the gangs affiliated with the Folk Nation”)).
170. Id. at 1309 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986) (“Given the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.”)).
“gang,” as used in the district policy, failed “to provide adequate notice of the prohibited conduct” and was therefore fatally vague.\textsuperscript{172} The statute at issue in \textit{Lanzetta} provided:

Any person not engaged in any lawful occupation, known to be a member of any gang consisting of two or more persons, who has been convicted at least three times of being a disorderly person, or who has been convicted of any crime, in this or in any other State, is declared to be a gangster.\textsuperscript{173}

Noting the numerous and varied meanings of the term “gang” found in dictionaries and in historical and sociological writings,\textsuperscript{174} the Court concluded that terms the statute “employs to indicate what it purports to denounce are so vague, indefinite, and uncertain that it must be condemned as repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”\textsuperscript{175} The Eighth Circuit found that, “The passage of nearly fifty years since \textit{Lanzetta} has only added to the multiple meanings of ‘gangs.’ Experts studying gangs agree with the Supreme Court and consider the term ‘gang’ ‘notoriously imprecise.’”\textsuperscript{176}

“[T]he failure to define the pivotal term of a regulation can render it fatally vague.”\textsuperscript{177} Since “gang” was the pivotal term in the challenged regulation, yet was undefined,\textsuperscript{178} the court concluded that, “[a] person of common intelligence must necessarily guess at the unde-

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\item[172.] Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
\item[173.] Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 452.
\item[174.] Id. at 453-54.

The majority of the vagueness claims ... entail, in some form or another, alleged uncertainty about what comprises a “gang.” The inconsistencies among these opinions reflect disagreement within and between communities of social scientists, law enforcement officials, and citizens about how to conceive of gangs. Although courts are primarily concerned with the formal statutory context, problems arise when official policies adopt widely-disputed, common parlance notions of “gangs” without saying more.

\textit{Id.} at 65-66.

\item[176.] Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310 (citing Scott Cummings & Daniel J. Monti, \textit{Gangs—The Origins and Impact of Contemporary Youth Gangs in the United States} (Albany: State University of New York Press 1993); Robert K. Jackson & Wesley D. McBride, \textit{Understanding Street Gangs} 20 (Placerville, Calif: Copperhouse Pub. Co. 1992) (meaning of “gang activity” is “as varied as the background and perspectives of those attempting to define it”). Cf. Gaut, 660 N.E.2d at 263 (“The subject matter of the law’s prohibitions is not merely broad, but open-ended and potentially limitless. The ordinance does not define, list, or explain what constitutes a ‘gang symbol’ or ‘gang colors’; it does not even define ‘gang.’”).

\item[177.] Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310. (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 690 (8th Cir. 1992) (criminal statute lacked “narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standard” identifying the conduct restricted void-for-vagueness) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 690 (1968))). See also Rios v. Lane, 812 F.2d 1032, 1038 (7th Cir. 1987) (prison regulation prohibiting “engaging or pressuring others to engage in gang activities or meetings, displaying, wearing or using gang insignia, or giving gang signals” void for vagueness).

\item[178.] Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1310.
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fined meaning of ‘gang related activities,’” and declared the regulation “void-for-vagueness.”

A regulation may be rendered void-for-vagueness if it violates the “well-recognized principle of language construction that it is inappropriate to define a word by using that same word in the definition.” In Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District, the district court declared unconstitutional a regulation that defined “gang-related apparel” as “[a]ny attire which identifies students as a group (gang-related).” Tautological definitions, such as “gang-related apparel” is “attire which is ‘gang-related,’” are patently ambiguous and unconstitutional.

A regulation must also define the conduct prohibited “in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” A school disciplinary policy or regulation that “allows school administrators and local police unfettered discretion to decide what represents a gang symbol” is void. “[A] central purpose of the vagueness doctrine [is] that ‘if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.’” Discretion cannot be absolute. Without specifically stated and enforced criteria for its exercise, discretion is absolute and “is authorization of arbitrariness.”

In Smith v. Goguen, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of defining prohibited conduct with specificity. The statute before the Court attached criminal liability to anyone “who treats contemptuously the flag of the United States.” The Court held the statute facially void-for-vagueness because it set forth a standard so indefinite that police and juries were free to act based on little more than their own views about how the flag should be treated.

“[G]ang symbols, as with display of the flag, take many forms and are constantly changing.” Accordingly, a school district must “define with some care the flag behavior it intends to outlaw.”

176. Id. at 1311; Paul D. Murphy, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a Dress Code Violate a Student’s Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. REV. 1321, 1328 (1991).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 664.
182. Id. at 664.
183. Id. at 664.
184. Id. at 610.
185. Id. at 610.
186. Id. at 610.
187. Id. at 568-69. “[B]ecause display of the flag is so common and takes so many forms, changing from one generation to another and often difficult to distinguish in principle, a legislature should define with some care the flag behavior it intends to outlaw.”
189. Id. at 581.
190. Id. at 568-69.
fine with some care’ the ‘gang related activities’ it wishes students to avoid”190 or risk arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of its policies. “The degree of constitutional vagueness depends partially on the nature of the enactment.”191 A school policy under which suspensions and expulsions are decided “solely on the basis of the subjective opinion of school administrators and local police” cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.192 This is especially true in states like North Carolina, where students are constitutionally guaranteed a fundamental right to receive an equal educational opportunity.193

While “‘there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief,’ [t]he gang problem, although complex, does not present such difficulties.”194 Ironically, the court in Stephenson found “evidence that a more precise definition of ‘gang related activities’ can be crafted” in the school district’s amended gang regulation.195 In Stephenson, the school district’s amended gang policy adopted the definitions of “criminal street gangs” set out in Iowa Code section 723A.1. The district’s amended policy defined a “gang” as

any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more criminal acts, which has an identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.

The amended policy defined “pattern of gang activity” as “the commission, attempt to commit, conspiring to commit, or solicitation of two or more criminal acts, provided the criminal acts were committed on separate dates or by two or more persons who are members of, or belong to, the same criminal street gang.”

Examples of constitutionally sound gang policies are readily available, yet many local school boards are unwilling to amend poorly drafted gang policies, no matter how constitutionally infirm. Under Durham Public School Policy 4301.10, for example, a student may be suspended for indeterminate period or even expelled for committing

190. Id.
191. Id. at 1308 (citing Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 689 (8th Cir. 1992)).
192. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311. “[T]he law does not permit the enjoyment of one’s property to depend upon the arbitrary or despotic will of officials.” Bizzell v. Goldsboro, 135 S.E. 50, 55 (N.C. 1926).
194. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311, n.6 (quoting U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79 (1973)).
195. Id.
“any act which furthers gangs or gang-related activities.”196 The policy defines a “gang” as “any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the commission of criminal acts and having a common name or common identifying sign, colors, or symbols.”197

While this language is virtually identical to language found in the amended policy quoted with approval in Stephenson, the Durham policy falls short of a precise definition of the conduct prohibited. Unlike the policy in Stephenson, the Durham definition requires criminal activity of the “group,” but not that its “members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.” The Durham policy subjects a student to suspension for committing “any act which furthers gangs or gang-related activities,” regardless of whether the student knowingly engaged in “gang-related activities.” As the Stephenson court observed, “a male student walking the halls of a [Durham] school with untied shoelaces, a Duke University baseball cap and a cross earring potentially violates the [Durham gang policy] in four ways.”198

The Durham policy also prohibits the “[w]earing, possessing, using, distributing, displaying, or selling any clothing, jewelry, emblems, badges, symbols, signs or other items which may be evidence of membership or affiliation in any gang.”199 This provision grants unfettered discretion to school officials to suspend or expel a student based on nothing more than their personal opinion of whether an item “may be evidence” of gang affiliation. Such a provision opens the door for discriminatory enforcement and is unconstitutionally vague. To paraphrase a long accepted axiom, “One man’s evidence is another man’s nonsense.”200

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197. Id.

198. Stephenson, 110 F.3d at 1311.


200. Consider, for example, the admission of evidence obtained from “spectral sources,” such as apparitions seen by the accusers, once used at the Salem witchcraft trials. David Thomas Konig, Law & Society in Puritan Massachusetts: Essex County County, 1629-1692 171-72 (Morris S. Arnold ed., University of North Carolina Press 1979).
The Durham policy also provides that, “The superintendent/designee shall consult with law enforcement officials semi-annually to establish a list of gang-related items, symbols and behaviors. The principal shall maintain this list in the main office of the school and shall notify students of the items, symbols and behaviors prohibited by this policy.” A similar policy was before the court in *Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School District.*\(^{201}\) The policy at issue in *Chalifoux* provided, “A sample list of specific items *that law enforcement agencies consider gang-related* is available in the principal’s office.”\(^{202}\) The court held the policy void for vagueness because it delegated to law enforcement officers unfettered discretion to determine what items represented gang apparel or symbols.\(^{203}\)

To avoid the risk of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by school officials and school resource officers, a school district should include a gang “validation” policy that identifies specific criteria sufficiently indicative of gang membership. To validate an individual as a gang member, statutes and school policies that require gang validation typically require school officials to establish satisfaction of three or more of the following criteria. The individual:

- is a self-proclaimed gang member;
- has tattoos of documented gang logos;
- demonstrates substantial knowledge of gang codes, hand signals, colors, and activities;
- is found in possession of writing, drawings, or photographs implicative of gang membership;
- is identified as a gang member by another law enforcement agency or other official source, such as the military or the department of corrections;
- is identified as a gang member by a parent or guardian;
- is identified as a criminal street gang member by a documented reliable informant;
- is identified as a gang member by an informant of previously untested reliability whose identification is corroborated by independent information;
- resides in or frequents a particular criminal street gang’s area and adopts their style of dress, their use of hand signs, or their tattoos;


\(^{202}\) *Id.* (emphasis in original).

\(^{203}\) *Id.*
has been arrested more than once in the company of validated gang members for offenses which are consistent with usual criminal street gang activity, such as home invasions, drive-by shootings, or drug-related offenses; or

has been observed on four or more occasions in the company of validated gang members. 204

School districts should not be permitted to maintain codes of student conduct that fail to clearly inform students what conduct is prohibited or that vest unchecked discretion in school officials. If local school boards are unwilling to revise gang policies to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, an action for declaratory judgment is proper to challenge the policies as void for vagueness. 205

III. POTENTIAL DEFENSES

A. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

A motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is treated, “according to its substance, as one challenging a court's subject matter jurisdiction” under Rule 12(b)(1). 206 Appellate review of the trial court’s order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is de novo. 207 “Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the [trial court].” 208 North Carolina courts have held that

in order to have standing for judicial review, five requirements must be satisfied: (1) the petitioner is an aggrieved party; (2) there was a final agency decision; (3) the decision was the result of a contested case; (4) all administrative remedies have been exhausted; and (5) there is no adequate procedure for judicial review under another statute. 209


The requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial redress serves two main purposes:

First, exhaustion protects “administrative agency authority.” Exhaustion gives an agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into [court],” and it discourages “disregard of [the agency’s] procedures.” Second, exhaustion promotes efficiency. Claims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in [court]. In some cases, claims are settled at the administrative level, and in others, the proceedings before the agency convince the losing party not to pursue the matter in [court]. “And even where a controversy survives administrative review, exhaustion of the administrative procedure may produce a useful record for subsequent judicial consideration.”

Exhaustion of either state judicial or state administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to the invocation of federal relief in actions brought under § 1983. This is especially true when violation of a substantive constitutional right, such as equal protection, is the subject of a § 1983 claim because the violation is complete when the prohibited action is taken. Beginning in 1963 with McNeese v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court has “on numerous occasions rejected the argument that a § 1983 action should be dismissed where the plaintiff has not exhausted state administrative remedies.” The

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[An agency or an officer in the executive branch of the government of the State and includes the Council of the State, the Governor’s Office, a board, a commission, a department, a division, a council, and any other unit of government in the executive branch. A local unit of government is not an agency. (emphasis by court). The court held that the City of Dunn was “a unit of local government” and therefore did not fall under the statutory definition of “agency” within the meaning of § 150B-2(1a). Id. at *2.


It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked. Hence the fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit in the federal court.

Id. at 184. See also Edward Valves, Inc. v. Wake County, 471 S.E.2d 342 (N.C. 1996). “[O]verlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to the question of the existence of a cause of action under § 1983.” Id. at 347 (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124 (1990)).


Court “has stated categorically that exhaustion is not a prerequisite to an action under § 1983, and [has] not deviated from that position in the nineteen years since McNeese,” regardless of whether the suit is instituted in state or federal court.\(^\text{216}\)

Two exceptions to this no-exhaustion rule have been recognized, however. First, Congress may explicitly provide that state administrative remedies must be exhausted before bringing suit under a particular federal law pursuant to § 1983. Second, Congress may implicitly require the exhaustion of state administrative remedies where “the obligation to require exhaustion of administrative remedies may be fairly understood from congressional action.” The mere provision of state administrative remedies, however, is not enough to demonstrate an implicit Congressional intent to impose an exhaustion requirement on a plaintiff seeking to bring a § 1983 action. If there is doubt as to whether an exception applies, courts should refrain from requiring exhaustion in § 1983 suits because “Patsy leaves no doubt that the presumption is strongly in favor of no exception.”\(^\text{217}\)

Actions based on violations of procedural due process present a more difficult question. The fundamental premise of procedural due process protection is notice and the opportunity to be heard; the opportunity to be heard must be at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.\(^\text{218}\) “An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of

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\(^{215}\) Id. at 500. “Since Patsy, the Supreme Court, this court, and other circuit courts of appeals have confirmed that, as a general rule, exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not required prior to bringing suit under § 1983.” Talbot v. Lucy Corr Nursing Home, 118 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 523 (1990) (“The availability of state administrative procedures ordinarily does not foreclose resort to § 1983.”)); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 147 (1988) (“[P]laintiffs need not exhaust state administrative remedies before instituting § 1983 suits in federal court.”); VanHarken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1997) (Patsy expressly rejected a requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before suing under § 1983.); Jeremy H. v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 283 n.20 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he policies of section 1983 strongly disfavor the imposition of additional exhaustion requirements.”); Thornquest v. King, 61 F.3d 837, 841 n.3 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A] section 1983 claim cannot be barred by a plaintiff's failure to exhaust state administrative remedies with respect to an unreviewed administrative action.”); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[E]xhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to the bringing of a section 1983 claim.”); Wilbur v. Harris, 53 F.3d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1995) (exhaustion of state administrative procedures ordinarily does not foreclose resort to action under § 1983); Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist. No. Two, 31 F.3d 183, 190-91 (4th Cir. 1994) (exhaustion of state administrative remedies not a prerequisite to § 1983 action).)

\(^{216}\) Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). See also Good Hope Hosp., Inc. v. N.C. DHHS, 620 S.E.2d 873, 879 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (“State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over § 1983 claims, and may hear certain constitutional claims even if administrative remedies have not been exhausted.”).

\(^{217}\) Talbot, 118 F.3d at 219 (citation omitted) (quoting Alacare, Inc.-N. v. Baggiano, 785 F.2d 963, 966-67 (11th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis in original).

law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a party seeking to exercise her constitutional right.\textsuperscript{219} When \textquoteleft\textquoteleft [t]he question presented is the due process of fairness of the 
\textit{procedures} by which discipline in public schools is administered, rather than the substantive correctness of the disciplinary decision or punishment itself; \ldots exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required.\textsuperscript{220} Due process provides heightened protection against government interference with fundamental rights and liberty interests.\textsuperscript{221} The equal opportunity to receive a public school education is just such a fundamental right. 

\lq\lq A pleading that alleges inadequacy of administrative remedy states a claim upon which equitable relief may be granted if the circumstances warrant it.\textsuperscript{222} \rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft [T]he exhaustion requirement may be excused if the administrative remedy would be futile or inadequate.\textsuperscript{223} \rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft In order, however, to rely upon futility or inadequacy, \rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft allegations of the facts justifying avoidance of the administrative process must be pled in the complaint.\textsuperscript{224} Inadequacy of administrative remedies may arise in a number of circumstances. 

The well-settled rule in North Carolina is that a constitutional challenge to a statute is \rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board.\textsuperscript{225} Because it is the province of the judiciary to make 

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\item Anderson v. Assimos, 553 S.E.2d 63, 68 n.4 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).
\item Givens v. Poe, 346 F. Supp. 202, 203 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (emphasis in original). \rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft here are situations in which exhaustion serves no useful purpose. Courts universally recognize that parents need not exhaust the procedures \ldots where resort to the administrative process would be either futile or inadequate.\rq\rq\textquoteleft\textsuperscript{220} Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988); Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1014 n.17 (1984); Kerr Ctr. Parents Ass'n v. Charles, 897 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1990); Wilson v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist. No. 6, 735 F.2d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir. 1984)).
\item Lloyd v. Babb, 251 S.E.2d 843, 851 (1979) (citing 2 COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 579 (1965)).
\item Id. (quoting Bryant v. Hogarth, 488 S.E.2d 269, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), disc. review denied, 494 S.E.2d 406 (N.C. 1997)). \textit{See also} Jackson v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 505 S.E.2d 899, 904 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998), disc. review denied, 537 S.E.2d 213 (N.C. 1999) (\rq\rq\textquoteleft\textquoteleft The burden of showing inadequacy [of the administrative remedy] is on the party claiming inadequacy, who must include such allegations in the complaint.\rq\rq\textquoteleft\textsuperscript{224} In 
\item Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 517 S.E.2d 406, 412 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Meads v. N.C. Dep't of Agric., 509 S.E.2d 165, 174 (N.C. 1998)). In \textit{Meads}, defendant agency argued lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by seeking a declaratory judgment from the agency as to the constitutionality of the regulations at issue. The North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
\begin{quote}[Defendant's] argument, however, ignores our well-settled rule that a statute's constitutionality shall be determined by the judiciary, not an administrative board. Because it is the province of the judiciary to make constitutional determinations, any effort made by [plaintiff] to have the constitutionality of the \ldots regulations determined by [defendant agency]
\end{quote}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
constitutional determinations, administrative remedies are inadequate, and plaintiffs are not required to exhaust them before bringing a declaratory judgment action to challenge the constitutional validity of a school board policy.226

In Lloyd v. Babb,227 a voting rights case, the available administrative remedy would have required the plaintiffs to individually challenge the voting rights of between 6,000 and 10,000 persons. On that basis, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that plaintiffs were not provided an effective administrative remedy and that plaintiffs’ claim for equitable relief could properly go forward.228 In cases alleging racially disparate disciplinary actions, the same reasoning would apply. In Copper v. Denlinger,229 for example, to support going forward as a class action, plaintiffs alleged, “On information and belief and based on statistics published by the Durham Public Schools, the class may include as many as 10,000 Durham Public School students.”230

The school board’s failure to properly publish disciplinary policies and procedures may also render administrative remedies inadequate.231 By statute, local boards of education are required to adopt policies not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and North Carolina, governing the conduct of students and establishing procedures to be followed by school officials in suspending or expelling any student, or in disciplining any student if the offensive behavior could result in suspension, expulsion, or the administration of corporal punishment . . . . Each local board shall pub-

would have been in vain. Accordingly, given the constitutional nature of this issue, the [administrative remedies] were inadequate, and therefore [plaintiff] was not required to exhaust them.


228. Id. at 851. In Lloyd, the plaintiffs alleged a pattern of illegal practices on the part of election officials. The defendants responded that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The North Carolina court disagreed:

In this plaintiffs are essentially attempting to require election officials to perform their legal duties. Plaintiffs’ standing to make such a claim has not been challenged. Nor should their failure to make challenges preclude them from seeking this kind of relief. If plaintiffs’ allegations are true, the challenge procedure would not provide an effective remedy. The challenge procedure might correct past wrongs by removing from the voting rolls those who had been improperly registered. It could do nothing, however, to halt ongoing improprieties nor could it prevent future ones. In summary, insofar as plaintiffs allege continuing improprieties in the registration practices of [election officials] they have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Id. at 852.


230. Complaint at ¶ 18, Cooper (No. 06 CVS 03257).

lish all the policies mandated by this subsection and *make them available* to each student and his parent or guardian at the beginning of each school year.\(^{232}\)

It is not uncommon for school board policies to be "published," yet not made "available" to all students and their parents. School board policies that are published on-line are generally not available to economically disadvantaged students and their families. Policies that are not clearly written are likewise not available to many students and parents. Administrative remedies provided by such policies are inadequate.

While it is generally said that ignorance of the law is no excuse for a failure to comply with the law, such a rule does not apply where the citizen is, as a matter of practicality, denied a reasonable means for finding out what the law is in the first place. . . . [I]t would contravene the most rudimentary principles of due process for [the court] to deny [suspended or expelled students] a right of judicial review because they had not exhausted an administrative remedy . . . which is effectively hidden in the catacombs of the [school board] bureaucracy.\(^{233}\)

The exhaustion requirement may be excused by futility of the administrative remedy, as when a school board creates barriers or routinely fails to enforce its published disciplinary policies and procedures. In *Copper v. Denlinger*, for example, plaintiffs alleged that, as a common policy, custom, and practice, the superintendent of Durham Public Schools intentionally failed to timely notify minority students of their right to appeal a long-term suspension to the school board, thereby effectively precluding exhaustion of their administrative remedies.\(^{234}\)

Under section 115C-391 of the North Carolina General Statutes, a student suspended for more than ten days by the superintendent may appeal the superintendent’s decision to the local board of education. A decision of the local board on appeal or a decision of expulsion by the local board is final and “is subject to judicial review in accordance

\(^{232}\) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-391(a) (2006) (emphasis added). These policies must also include “a reasonable dress code for students.” *Id.*

\(^{233}\) *Orange County*, 265 S.E.2d at 908.

\(^{234}\) *Copper*, supra note 31, at ¶¶ 273-78. Two plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent notified them by letter that she had approved the principal’s recommendation of long-term suspension for the remainder of the school year and advised them of their right to appeal her decision to the school board by delivering written notice of appeal to her office by January 9, 2006. Plaintiffs alleged that the superintendent’s letters, both of which were dated December 14, 2005, were not postmarked until January 14 and January 16, 2007, well after the appeal deadline had expired. A third plaintiff, also suspended for the remainder of the school year, received no notice, timely or otherwise, of his right to appeal the superintendent’s decision to the school board.
with Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes.” 235 Under the provisions governing the right to judicial review, any person who is aggrieved by the final decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all administrative remedies made available to him by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial review of the decision under this Article, unless adequate procedure for judicial review is provided by another statute, in which case the review shall be under such other statute. Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent any person from invoking any judicial remedy available to him under the law to test the validity of any administrative action not made reviewable under this Article. 236

In addition to allegations that administrative remedies were precluded by the failure to timely notify plaintiffs of their right to appeal their suspensions, the complaint in Copper v. Denlinger also alleged that, on December 13, 2004, the superintendent suspended one student for the remainder of the school year, that the student’s family retained counsel, and that the school board ignored repeated letters from counsel explaining that the student had missed the appeal deadline because his father was hospitalized for major surgery and asking the board to extend the time to appeal the superintendent’s decision of long-term suspension. 237 Counsel’s letters were dated February 17, March 22, and April 5, 2005. 238 In his March 22, 2005, letter, counsel wrote, “The possible mistaken suspension of a student who has no serious record of misbehavior and is academically accomplished, should be seriously and timely considered.” 239 Counsel’s letter of April 5, 2005, stated, “To refuse a hearing and state your reasons is one thing. However, to simply ignore the plea of a parent and child who have an arguable right to appeal is unconscionable,” and that, “The Constitution, case law and your Board Policy provide the opportunity for every student to challenge allegations made against them in a long term suspension. This right has been denied to [the suspended student] with no reason given.” 240

On May 12, 2005, five months after the student was suspended, three months after receiving the first letter from the student’s retained counsel, and with less than two weeks remaining in the school year, the school board agreed to retroactively reduce the student’s long-term suspension to ten days. 241 The board’s delay of five months profoundly impacted the student’s educational progress and indicated a

237. Copper, supra note 234, at ¶¶ 138-52.
238. Id. at ¶¶ 143, 145, 149.
239. Id. at ¶ 146.
240. Id. at ¶¶ 150-51.
241. Id. at ¶ 152.
careless, if not willful, disregard of his rights to a fair administrative remedy. Regrettably, in many instances, disregard for the administrative remedy denied to students of color is not the worst of it.

The futility of administrative remedies is all too evident when school officials falsify documents to cut off a student’s right to appeal to the school board a superintendent’s decision of long-term suspension or when a school board willfully turns a deaf ear to repeated complaints of equal protection and due process violations by the superintendent and other school officials.

While school policies may ostensibly provide administrative remedies for students who are expelled or suspended long-term, if the administrative remedies are inadequate, they need not be exhausted before bringing claims based on equal protection or due process violations. Practitioners should be prepared to face these challenges head-on.

B. Immunity

A defense based on immunity may be raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) made prior to any responsive pleading. At the initial pleading stage, a defense of immunity is treated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and the plaintiff's allegations of fact are taken as true. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a trial court may look only to the allegations of the complaint to determine whether qualified immunity is established. Beyond the initial motion to dismiss, defendants bear the burden of establishing a justification for immunity.

242. Id. at ¶¶ 99-120. The complaint alleges that a student and his mother met with the school principal and others on October 6, at which time the student was told he could return to school on October 14. Upon his return to school on October 14, a counselor presented the student with a letter from the superintendent dated October 8 approving a transfer request “effective immediately.” The request was allegedly submitted by the school principal on October 2, four days before he told the student he could return on October 14. These two documents made it appear that the student had only been suspended short-term, from which he had no right to appeal. The student was in fact suspended for thirteen days, or long-term, from which he was owed a right to appeal his suspension.

243. Id. at ¶ 517 (“In the fall of 2005, in response to growing public outcry against the ongoing racial discrimination in Durham Public Schools, [white school board members] ordered the arrest of the most outspoken citizens, . . . and refused to hear their complaints.”).


245. Meyer v. Walls, 471 S.E.2d 422, 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996). See also Toomer, 574 S.E.2d at 86 (when raised by motion, immunity generally raised by Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss).


1. **Sovereign Immunity**

The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to claims based on federal law,\(^248\) nor does it bar claims brought under the North Carolina State Constitution. “[W]hen there is a clash between . . . constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights must prevail.”\(^249\) “[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar a direct claim against the State when the claim is based on a violation of the Declaration of Rights of the North Carolina Constitution.”\(^250\)

In *Fennell v. Stephenson*, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s action alleging a pattern and practice of racially-influenced traffic stops of Black motorists by the North Carolina Highway Patrol. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed. “Because this claim alleged a violation of [plaintiff’s] right to equal protection under the North Carolina Constitution, the Highway Patrol was not entitled to assert the doctrine of sovereign immunity as a defense to this claim.”\(^251\)

2. **Qualified Immunity**

In certain cases brought under § 1983, qualified immunity may serve to protect government officials from personal liability.\(^252\) Whether qualified immunity should shield an officer from personal liability depends on three considerations: (1) whether the plaintiff has identified a specific constitutional right; (2) whether that right is clearly established; and (3) whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known the actions complained of would violate that right.\(^253\) Defendants have the burden to establish the defense of qualified immunity.\(^254\)

The first two considerations, whether plaintiffs have identified a specific constitutional right and whether that right is clearly established, are questions of law for the court, more properly decided at the

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\(^{249}\) Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292.

\(^{250}\) Fennell v. Stephenson, 528 S.E.2d 911, 917-18 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Corum, 413 S.E.2d at 292). See also Fabrikant v. Currituck County, 621 S.E.2d 19, 25 (N.C. 2005) (for purposes of motion to dismiss, complaint need only allege facts that, if taken as true, are sufficient to establish waiver of sovereign immunity and lack of specificity is not fatal).

\(^{251}\) See Fennell, 528 S.E.2d at 918.


\(^{253}\) *Id.* at 425-46 (citing Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992)).

\(^{254}\) *Id.*
summary judgment stage.\(^{255}\) For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint must be accepted as true. The threshold inquiry is whether plaintiffs’ allegations, taken as true, establish a constitutional violation.\(^{256}\)

The second inquiry, whether the identified right was clearly established, is also a question of law.\(^{257}\) In making this determination, the Court need not look beyond decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of North Carolina.\(^{258}\) A public school student’s constitutional rights to due process and equal protection are clearly and incontrovertibly well-established.\(^{259}\)

The third consideration, whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would have known that challenged actions would violate that right, requires a factual determination of any disputed aspects of the officer’s conduct.\(^{260}\) The finder of fact must first determine “whether the conduct at issue actually occurred,” and if so, “whether a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct would violate” the right identified.\(^{261}\) If there are disputed questions of fact regarding the officer’s conduct, this inquiry cannot be answered as matter of law, even at the summary judgment stage.\(^{262}\)

3. Public Official Immunity

Public official immunity protects public officials from personal liability for negligence.\(^{263}\) In proper cases, a public official “engaged in the performance of governmental duties involving the exercise of judgment and discretion” is shielded from liability unless his actions “were allegedly: (1) corrupt; (2) malicious; (3) outside of and beyond the scope of his duties; (4) in bad faith; or (5) willful and deliber-


\(^{256}\) Hyatt v. Town of Lake Lure, 225 F. Supp. 2d 647, 663 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002)). See also id. (whether plaintiff has identified specific constitutional right is a question of law for the court).

\(^{257}\) Id.

\(^{258}\) Id. at 663-64.


\(^{260}\) Davis, 449 S.E.2d at 244 (citing Lee v. Greene, 442 S.E.2d 547, 550 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).

\(^{261}\) Id.

\(^{262}\) Id. at 246. See also Lee, 442 S.E.2d at 550 (summary judgment improper if there are disputed questions of fact regarding the officers’ conduct).

\(^{263}\) Meyer v. Walls, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (N.C. 1997).
However, immunity does not apply when the official is engaged in purely ministerial functions.  

4. Legislative Immunity

School board members may sometimes assert the defense of legislative immunity. To establish this defense, defendants must show: (1) they were acting in a legislative capacity when the challenged acts were committed; and (2) their acts were not illegal. Illegal acts of race discrimination are not “in aid of legislative activity” for purposes of legislative immunity.

5. Quasi-Judicial Immunity

If applicable, the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity protects individual public school officials from personal liability. In determining whether quasi-judicial immunity should be available, courts consider three main criteria: (1) whether the official's functions are similar to those of a judge; (2) whether a strong need exists for the official to perform essential functions for the public good without fear of harassment and intimidation; and (3) whether adequate procedural safeguards exist to protect against constitutional deprivations. A complaint, which does not allege actions taken by school defendants during hearings related to disciplinary actions and appeals, does not give rise to quasi-judicial immunity as a possible defense.

C. The Political Question Doctrine

The political question doctrine is “based on constitutional provisions relating to the distribution of powers among the branches of government, and it is as a function of the separation of powers that political questions are not determinable by the judiciary.” Under the political question doctrine, a question may become “not justiciable because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.” "The ... doctrine excludes from judicial review those contro-
versies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch. The Judiciary is particularly ill-suited to make such decisions . . . .”

School defendants may move to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on grounds that claims relating to adoption, interpretation, and enforcement of school policies are non-justiciable under the political question doctrine. The North Carolina Supreme Court has specifically addressed and rejected this argument.

It has long been understood that it is the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the requirements of our Constitution. When a government action is challenged as unconstitutional, the courts have a duty to determine whether that action exceeds constitutional limits. Therefore, it is the duty of this Court to address plaintiff-parties' constitutional challenge to the state's public education system. Defendants' argument is without merit.

As the Supreme Court observed even before Brown v. Board of Education,

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

IV. CONCLUSION

Ubuntu

The North Carolina State Constitution decrees that, "Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged." Congress has declared it to be:

the policy of the United States that a high quality education for all individuals and a fair and equal opportunity to obtain that education are a societal good, are a moral imperative, and [will] improve the life of every individual, because the quality of our individual lives ultimately depends on the quality of the lives of others.

What we in America have yet to grasp is that our civic health is similarly indivisible. We have embarked on a path of triage, lost in the fantasy that by banishing children at risk from our schools, we are delivering law, order, and morals. On the contrary: there is no morality in depriving any child of the most basic tools she needs to succeed in life, and there is no order in constructing what threatens to be a large, enduring, and hopeless underclass.

With each passing day, our young people journey further along the uncertain road to adulthood. The nature of their journey, the kind of adults they will become, the lives they will lead, the joy they will know, the good they will do, will be profoundly influenced by the educational opportunities open to them along the way. Without question, providing our children a safe environment in which to learn is a critical concern. Just as critical, however, is what they are to learn in that environment.

Zero tolerance does not teach citizenship. It teaches racial mistrust by perpetuating the stereotype of young black men and other children of color as gang members and criminals. It teaches cowardliness. It teaches self-interest, disrespect, and intolerance. It teaches dishonesty and irresponsibility. It teaches bigotry. It teaches complicity. It is a lie. In far too many instances, zero tolerance is a pretext offered by school boards and school officials to avoid their duty to provide an equal educational opportunity to all students and to teach poor minority

Ubuntu really means that I am because you are. We belong together. Our humanity is bound up with one another. We say in our languages, a person is a person through other persons. A solitary human being is a contradiction in terms. I learn how to become a human being through association with other human beings.

ABDULKADER TAYOB & WOLFRAM WEISSE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN SOUTH AFRICA: FROM APARTHEID TO DEMOCRACY 72 (Waxmann Publishing Co. 1999) (quoting Desmond Tutu as quoted by Hallencreutz and Palmberg).

277. N.C. CONST. art. IX § 1.
279. Blumenson and Nilsen, supra note 107, at 117. “On average, a high school dropout costs society between $243,000 and $388,000 over his or her lifetime due to both a lack of productivity and dependence on government subsidies.” Alicia C. Insley, Suspending and Expelling Children from Educational Opportunity: Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1065 (2001) (citing Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, U.S. Dep't of Just., Juvenile Offenders & Victims: 1999 National Report 82-83). Noting that lack of education imposes even higher costs on society when high school dropouts become involved in crime or drug use, in which case the societal cost rises to between $1.7 and $2.3 million dollars over a lifetime. Id.
children the skills they will need to walk away from poverty and take their rightful place in our community.

No child should be denied the benefit of a public school education except in the most compelling circumstances and then only after the accused child is afforded the rights of due process guaranteed by the Constitutions of the United States and the State of North Carolina. In a nation that pledges allegiance to the precepts of liberty and justice for all, the frequency with which racial animus deprives our most vulnerable citizens of their fundamental, constitutionally mandated civil rights remains a shadow of shame. When public school officials fail to honor the pledge of allegiance and the promise of *Brown v. Board of Education*, persons of integrity and ability, especially members of the legal profession, must step forward on their behalf.

Consider this a call to arms.

280. See *Joe R. Feagin, Racist America: Roots, Current Realities and Future Reparations* 128 (New York: Routledge 2000). Most white Americans today believe that racial oppression is no longer a problem in this country. They are mistaken. “Today most white Americans greatly underestimate the degree to which the nation is still such a total racist society.” *Id.* at 26. “In one way or another, all black Americans continue to suffer discrimination because white domination of black Americans and other people of color remains a major organizing principle for life in the United States.” *Id.* at 128.